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In a context of liberalized financial systems, microfinance allows millions of 
households, usually excluded from classical financial services, to begin or reinforce their 
own activities and become microentrepreneurs. Yet, in spite of the success of numerous 
microfinance institutions (MFI), many difficulties remain which must be urgently 
resolved in view of their ambitious objectives. First, a large number of the rural 
households still lack access to financial services. Second, most of the existing MFI are 
not yet financially sustainable. Finally, while funds from governments and donors are 
rapidly increasing, financial institutions still need solid foundations to avoid management 
failures. These issues raise questions of the role of the state to promote MFI including (1) 
which state-owned institutions may be necessary? (2) which level and type of 
subsidization of the financial institutions can be accepted? (3) what can be the choice for 
the state between alternative investments in financial institutions or complementary 
services? (4) what are the necessary conditions for creating a favorable environment? 
This paper presents the evolution of views on the role of the state in the financial 
system including theoretical and empirical points of view from the interventionist period 
of the 1960s and 1970s to the current period of liberalization. Based on country case 
studies illustrating the divergent role of the state in the development of the rural financial 
system, the paper reviews the respective role of the state, the NGO and the private 
commercial banks in increasing their outreach and in adopting microfinance innovations. 




The paper concludes with a discussion of the necessary roles of the state to 
promote MFI. The role of the state encompasses insuring a minimum banking structure in 
the rural areas, subsidizing microfinance start-up capital and innovations, and investing in 
complementary services such as infrastructure, health, and education. The state must also 
develop a clear and flexible regulatory framework for MFI with the means to enforce the 
rules for the supervisory bodies. The paper also concludes that efficient governance is 
more of a determinant than the distinction of ownership by the private or the public sector 
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Microfinance arouses enthusiasm among donors, practitioners, researchers, and 
the state. This interest is based on the success of a few famous financial institutions in 
mobilizing savings and distributing large amounts of credit, with high repayment rates 
and good outreach on a rather sustainable basis. Microfinance has allowed millions of 
households usually excluded from classical financial services to begin their own 
economic activities or to reinforce existing efforts and become microentrepreneurs. 
Yet, many difficulties remain that must be resolved in view of the ambitious 
objectives attached to microfinance programs. Three main issues have to be clarified. 
First, a large number of the poor households still lack access to financial services. Impact 
studies show that for the poorest of the poor, the necessary environment is not yet in 
place for microfinance to realize its full potential. Second, most of the microfinance 
institutions still have to demonstrate their capacity to reach a break-even point that would 
allow them to work without being subsidized. The trade-off between becoming 
financially sustainable or reaching the poor is a frequent debate, which shows that the 
role of microfinance as a policy instrument is not straightforward. Finally, in support of 
microfinance, governments and donors are increasing the amount of funds invested in 
order to develop new institutions rapidly and to reach an increasing number of clients. 
But financial institutions must be built on solid foundations to avoid a decreasing rate of 
repayment or risk of mismanagement. Time, good institutional design, and a favorable 




These issues raise questions about what role the state can assume in order to 
increase outreach, impact, and sustainability of the MFIs:  (1) What state-owned 
institutions are necessary?  (2) What level of subsidization of financial institutions is 
desirable?  (3) What are the state’s choices among alternative investments in financial 
institutions or complementary services? (4) How to create and instill confidence in a 
regulatory framework for microfinance? 
This paper focuses on microfinance in the rural financial system, because 
exclusion from classical financial services is of utmost importance in rural areas. A 
number of country case studies in Asia and Africa are examined to illustrate the role of 
the state in the development of the rural financial system. The countries use different 
modes of government intervention for microfinance innovations: microfinance is 
sometimes integrated into the public sector (model of integration in India or Viet Nam); it 
can be complementary to state-owned institutions (model of complementarity in 
Indonesia or Burkina Faso); or, it can be an alternative to the rather deficient role of the 
government (model of alternative in Madagascar or West Africa). The structure, conduct, 
and performance of both the microfinance institutions and the financial systems must be 
analyzed and compared for the different models. These will help in understanding the 
complementarities and trade-offs between public institutions and the private sector (for-
profit institutions and NGOs) that can lead to an efficient rural financial system for the 
poor. 
This paper presents the evolution of theoretical and empirical points of view on 




and 1970s to the current period of liberalization.  Then, the respective roles of the state, 
the NGOs, and the private commercial banks in terms of adoption of innovations and 
outreach are reviewed to understand when the state can promote, support, develop or on 
the contrary, impede the development of microfinance. Finally, different issues are 
analyzed regarding regulation of microfinance institutions, compared with commercial 
banks.  
 
2. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE ROLE OF THE STATE 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR 
State, in its wider sense, refers to a set of institutions that possess the means of 
legitimate coercion, exercised over a defined territory and its population, referred to as 
society. The state monopolizes rule-making within its territory through the medium of an 
organized government.  Government is normally regarded as consisting of three distinct 
sets of powers: one is the legislature, whose role is to make the law; the second is the 
executive, which is responsible for implementing the law; the third is the judiciary, which 
is responsible for interpreting and applying the law (World Bank 1997).  
Within the private sector, one should distinguish between the for-profit private 
sector and the not-for-profit private sector, represented by the NGOs. In this paper, NGOs 
in microfinance will represent both the operators and the member-based organizations 
such as village banks, solidarity groups, and cooperatives that are implemented by the 
operators. The role of the donors, as providers of funds, will be included when the role of 




JUSTIFICATION OF THE ROLE OF THE STATE 
The World Bank (1997) classifies the functions of the state (Table 1). 
Neoclassical theory stipulates that individuals are rational and that the free functioning of 
the market should lead to an optimal allocation of resources. The state must build a 
conducive environment both for financial markets and for the rest of the economy. Yet, it 
seems that, as expressed by Krahnen and Schmidt (1994), "there is a need for 
intervention and technical assistance, even if ‘financial repression’ has been abolished." 
The role of the state in the financial system may be justified to cope with market failures 
and to improve equity.  
Table 1—Functions of the state 
  Addressing market failures  Improving equity 
Minimal 
functions 
Providing pure public goods 
(Defense, law and order, property rights, macroeconomic 
management, public health) 




























Activist functions  Coordinating private activity 
(Fostering markets, cluster initiatives) 
Redistribution 
(Asset redistribution) 
Source: World Bank 1997. 
 
Addressing Market Failures 
The advances in theoretical economics of the past 20 years have provided a 




for financial markets. These market failures are a first rationale for continued state 
intervention in the financial system (Stiglitz 1992; Besley 1994). However, government 
may have only limited abilities to intervene to improve matters. Design of appropriate 
institutions and interventions have then to be balanced and both the capacities of the 
public and the private sector have to be taken into account. 
As a minimal function for macroeconomic management, state intervention in the 
financial system has always been largely developed to ensure macroeconomic stability 
and to help the governments in the implementation of their economic policies. The state’s 
macroeconomic role in defining the regulatory framework and fiscal and monetary policy 
is widely accepted as providing a public good. But questions remain about how this 
framework should be implemented for microfinance institutions and whether intervention 
using public funds
1 is justified. Moreover, as expressed by Besley (1994), the 
government may also be part of the enforcement problem as, for example, forgiving some 
influent but delinquent borrowers can result in a political gain. 
Another public good in the new market of microfinance is represented by 
institutional innovations. Because pilot projects in microfinance target clients previously 
excluded from the classical financial system, they might face high risk and high 
information and start-up costs. The returns are likely to be captured by the rest of the 
financial system, which may then adopt the successful innovations. As a public good, 
innovation in microfinance may benefit from donors and state investments that will help 
                                                 
1 Public funds (from the state or donors) can be distributed (1) through subsidies that do not incur any 
return to investment, such as subsidization of interest rates, or (2) through public investment in physical or 




design services and structures to improve outreach, sustainability, and impact of the 
MFIs. Once successful, these services and structures can be broadly replicated. 
Regulating monopoly and compensating for missing markets have often justified 
the development of MFIs to fill the gap of the formal financial system and to oppose the 
monopoly of informal moneylenders. However, as expressed by Besley (1994), it is not 
clear that market power, e.g., by village moneylenders, is socially inefficient even though 
its redistributive consequences may be viewed as negative for the poor. Providing credit 
alternatives may be a reasonable response from the perspectives of distributional 
concerns but might have little to do with market failures. East Asian governments, for 
example, have created development banks and used directed credit to fill the gaps in the 
types of credit private entities provided with a relative success, thanks to their flexibility 
and a good incentive and monitoring structure (Stiglitz and Uy 1996). 
Financial markets are also particularly subject to imperfect information due to the 
characteristics of exchange: money is given up today in exchange for a promise in the 
future. Such promises are frequently broken, and the financial institutions have to face 
problems of imperfect information. MFIs in particular will have to cope with risks of 
opportunistic behavior of clients (moral hazard), difficulty in the selection of borrowers 
(adverse selection), problems of lack of collateral and missing insurance markets. 
Governments can face the same problems of imperfect information as the private sector 
and may have no better incentives to induce repayment on the financial market (Besley, 




of collateral (e.g., through a clear definition of property rights
2) and in improving access 
to insurance markets and other missing markets.  
Finally, as the activist functions underscored by the World Bank (1997) and 
following the new analysis developed by Stiglitz (1998), it can be useful to understand 
how can government and the private sector act together, as partners. For example, 
governments can create rents that enhance incentives for prudential behavior in the 
financial sector. The public policies that led to growth in East Asia sought not to replace 
markets and market forces, but to use and direct them; government lending programs, 




The need to improve equity may also prompt state intervention even in the 
absence of market failure. Competitive financial markets may distribute capital in 
socially unacceptable ways. Government action may be required to protect and assist the 
vulnerable (World Bank 1997). Microfinance institutions have been developed in this 
new framework, aimed at reaching the excluded population or, as presented above, aimed 
at undermining the monopoly power of the local moneylenders.  
The role of microfinance in increasing income and smoothing consumption can 
help providing safety nets. Two elements can justify government intervention to provide 
                                                 




social insurance: as explained above, government can invest in innovation; moreover, it 
has the capacity to work at national level so that it can cope with covariant risks. 
Innovative arrangements can respond to equity requirements in particular in 
providing microfinance services in the underserved rural areas and for the poor 
population. As expressed by Besley (1994), for both political and incentive reasons, 
credit market intervention to help the poor may make sense as an alternative to 
attempting any intervention in asset redistribution. 
Based on this theoretical framework, the empirical intervention of the state and 
the private sector in the microfinance system will be analyzed in order to understand 
better when the state can improve outreach, impact, and sustainability of MFIs. 
 
3. CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN 
THE 1960s AND 1970s 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL BANKS 
One of the main objectives of the developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s 
was to increase agricultural production by facilitating the adoption of improved 
technologies by farmers.  The rationale for reaching this objective were as follows: 
 
1. The main constraint for farmers is access to capital and to new technologies; 
capital must be injected into the rural areas through in-kind credit packages, 
including fertilizers, pesticides, improved seeds, or equipment. Public 




2. On average, the rural population is poor, and farmers often depend on 
usurious moneylenders for their access to capital to finance their inputs; to 
break these links with expensive sources of funds, interest rates must be 
subsidized. 
3. The rural population is too poor and subject to too many shocks to save, so no 
savings schemes are implemented. The objective is to inject funds into the 
rural areas, not to act as intermediaries between savers and borrowers. 
 
To meet these objectives, there was little concern for building an efficient rural 
financial market. Economic policies focused on the direct intervention of the state, rather 
than on developing a conducive economic environment. 
Based on these principles, most of the developing countries created agricultural 
development banks or implemented credit programs within agricultural development 
projects. A few examples from the countries examined in this paper illustrate this 
development. Following independence in 1948, the government of India pioneered the 
practice of state-sponsored rural development banking. Acting through the Reserve Bank 
of India, the government wanted to provide "social banking" in competition with the 
private moneylenders, with affordable loans for the rural producer. The land development 
banks for long-term finance and cooperative banks for short-term finance were created, 
and 20 major commercial banks were nationalized in 1969 and in 1980. Twenty-five 




Development Program (IRDP), which was initiated in 1979; at present it serves some 20 
millions rural families (Hulme and Mosley 1996). 
Thanks to oil income, the Indonesian government was able to build two networks 
to implement its Green Revolution program: 3,600 “village units” of the Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia (BRI) were in charge of channeling subsidized loans and more than 6,000 
"village cooperatives" (Koperasi Unit Desa [KUD]) provided the technical support for 
improved technology on rice production. 
In francophone West Africa, public agricultural development banks (Banque 
Nationale de Développement Agricole [BNDA]) were implemented to provide financing 
to producer organizations for the technical support of agricultural projects or 
development companies. The system of financing was slightly different from one country 
to another and changed over time. In general, it consisted of loans given in-kind to the 
producers (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, equipment), which were reimbursed at harvest 
time thanks to the commercialization monopoly of the development companies. Inputs 
and loans were subsidized through external funds from donors and through the reuse of 
export taxes. This system was implemented for cash crops. Food crops only indirectly 
benefited from it through reallocation of the inputs.  
 
4. FAILURES AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL 
BANKS 
Most of these institutions rapidly faced problems. The low repayment rate was 




were not sustainable and relied more and more on subsidies. A closer look at the impact 
of the development banks also revealed that they generally did not reach small farmers 
(Adams and Vogel 1986). 
Several points explain these failures. Political interference and lack of 
responsibility among bank staff led to biased selection of borrowers and arbitrary loan 
waivers, which led to decreasing repayment rates. In India, for example, appraisals of 
some loans were made by nonbank staff, namely local government officials entrusted 
with the allocation of Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP) loans. As a 
consequence, the banks did not regard the IRDP as their program and were only involved 
in it in a mechanical manner (Hulme and Mosley 1996).  
Moreover, there were no rewards for the employees when repayment was good. 
When some type of performance appraisal existed, it was only based on the volume of 
loans distributed or the rate of adoption of new technologies among the borrowers. In 
fact, there was little incentive for the bank staff to make the borrowers repay. From the 
point of view of the borrowers, the lack of flexibility, due to in-kind loans and loan size 
rigidly dictated by the nature of the borrower’s enterprise, decreased their interest for 
these types of services and as a consequence decreased also their incentive to repay. 
The ceilings on the interest rate, the low repayment rates, the absence of savings 
mobilization, and sometimes mismanagement of the institution led to a low or negative 
financial profitability for the state-owned institutions. In the case of the West African 
BNDA, the system did not take into account ways to cope with covariant risks, so that 




BNDA. Some of them have been transformed following the French model of the Caisse 
Nationale de Credit Agricole (CNCA). Two of them (CNCA Burkina Faso and Mali) still 
operate, as they continue to support the cotton sector. 
In facing all of the problems of the state-owned institutions, the most important 
catalyst for change occurs when governments are financially constrained: for example, in 
1983–84 in Indonesia with the drop in the oil income. India, by virtue of its large home 
market and diversified export base, was not hit by macroeconomic and debt crisis until 
1991, when inflation rose and foreign exchange reserves decreased. India was forced into 
accepting a structural adjustment program that led to restructuring of the financial 
system. In another example, most of the West African banks were dismantled or 
transformed as part of the structural adjustment programs of the 1990s. In Madagascar, a 
long trend toward reform and liberalization was implemented in the 1980s; as a result the 
BTM, the public rural bank created in 1975, is now undergoing privatization.  
Nevertheless, in spite of the crisis and the adjustments that became necessary for 
most of the financial systems in the developing countries, the development banks have 
had some positive impact, which should not be ignored. Networks of financial branches 
have been built in the rural areas. In Indonesia, more than 9,000 village units of the BRI 
and villages cooperatives (KUD) are spread throughout rural areas, while branches of 
126,000 financial institutions cover rural India.
3 Even if some networks may have to be 
                                                 
3 These include 94,000 primary Agriculture Cooperative Societies, 890 Primary Land Development Banks, 





closed, other may be able to support large development of the rural financial services 
once liberalization is complete. 
Moreover, these policies, aimed at improving agricultural production, have led to 
the adoption of new technologies, such as use of animal traction in West Africa
4 and 
improved seeds and fertilizers for rice in India and Indonesia. As a consequence, 
agricultural production has increased. Indonesia, for example, became self-sufficient in 
rice in 1984, after being the world’s largest importer in 1970. Production results like 
these were the main objectives of the governments in directly intervening in rural 
financial policy. 
 
5. CURRENT REALITIES OF THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM 
Owing to the failure of the state-owned financial institutions, the financial 
markets in developing countries have been oriented toward more liberalization since the 
1980s. However, divergent measures and reactions have been observed in different 
countries, leading to different equilibria between the roles of the state, the private for-
profit institutions, and the NGOs. The development of microfinance institutions in the 
                                                 
4 In Senegal, in the area of the peanut plantations, for example, the shift from manual work in the field to 
mechanization has been observed as well as adoption of fertilizer and improved seeds for corn. This was 
partly due to access to subsidized in-kind loans. Now, owing in particular to the failure of the state-financed 
program (1981), the equipment has not been repaired, the corn area is decreasing, and soil fertility is 
declining with the drop in the use of fertilizer.  The question still remains of how to maintain a high level of 




developing countries has been more or less linked to state intervention, described through 
three types of models: integration, complementarity, and alternative. 
 
THE MODEL OF INTEGRATION 
In countries such as India and Viet Nam, the state maintains a strong presence and 
microfinance innovations are integrated within the public sector. In India, programs to 
promote assured access to banking services for the rural poor have been on the 
development agenda since the early 1950s. A major justification for the nationalization of 
banks in 1969 was to force them to extend their lending to the rural areas in general and 
to the rural poor in particular (Kabeer and Murthy 1996). Currently there are 
approximately 126,000 public financial institutions or branches spread over India, 
implementing 25 poverty alleviation schemes. In order to compensate for the failure of 
the previous programs, new ones are developed such as the pilot project to link banks 
with self-help groups initiated by the National Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(NABARD), the apex agricultural credit bank (Srinivasan and Rao 1996). Only a few 
reorganizations have been implemented for the old state-owned institutions: as the 
government’s halting progress in the matter of the Regional Rural Banks’ reorganization 
indicates, pressures from trade unions and possibly from political lobbies of the land-
owning borrowers (who benefit most from subsidized interest and loan and interest 
waivers) would have to be overcome before restructuring of the rural credit system is 




As Viet Nam evolves toward a market economy, state intervention still continues 
in the rural financial system (Creusot et al. 1997; Colliot and Ngan 1997; Johnson 1996). 
The Viet Nam Bank for Agriculture was created by the state in 1990; it is a commercial 
bank using the classical banking criteria to distribute loans (such as physical guarantees 
and analysis of risks). By 1996, it had a substantial nationwide outreach with more than 
1,800 branches spread over the country. In order to reach the poor, the state created in 
1995 a nonprofit branch of the bank, the Viet Nam Bank for the Poor. Relying on 
subsidized credit and founded on political preoccupations, its capacity to reach financial 
sustainability is questionable. In spite of the 60 or so microfinance programs recently 
implemented by NGOs, the formal rural financial system in Viet Nam is still mainly 
driven by the state. Indeed, the new microfinance programs face financial and legal 
constraints such as an interest rate ceiling that impedes their development. 
 
THE MODEL OF COMPLEMENTARITY 
In some countries, the state and the private sector are complementary and do not 
exclude each other. Either the private or the public sector may adopt microfinance 
innovations. One of the most interesting examples comes from Indonesia. 
In Indonesia, the village units of the public bank BRI have been successfully 
restructured, spurred by an alarming decline in loan repayment in 1983–84. BRI is a 
public bank, but the principles of the transformation of the village units consisted of 
"privatization" of their internal operations (decentralized decision-making, a profit 




professionalism of the staff, and increased flexibility. The government assumed the full 
costs of the transformation by covering the losses incurred under the Green Revolution 
program (Bimas), capitalizing the village units, and establishing training programs for the 
staff. Savings from public banks are guaranteed by the state, which generates an incentive 
to save. The transformation of the BRI village units took place within the context of an 
overall deregulation of the financial sector (Mukherjee 1997). A regulatory framework 
has been progressively defined since 1983. It offers in particular a clear and flexible 
status for the small banks named Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (BPRs).
5 In June 1993, around 
900 new BPRs were operating, 95 percent of them private. This large system of private 
financial institutions adopts and develops innovations to reach rural areas, such as 
linkages, incentives to mobilize savings, Islamic principles of profit-sharing, and 
interregional network building (Lapenu 1996, 1998). Before the current financial crisis in 
Indonesia,
6 the rural financial system was characterized by its strong public banking 
system supporting various microfinance programs, cooperatives, and a diversified 
competing network of numerous small private banks, BPR. In this model of 
                                                 
5 Bank Perkreditan Rakyat means people’s credit bank or rural bank. These banks are required to provide a 
minimum capital of $25,000 (Rp 50 million 1995), compared with $5 million (Rp 10 billion) for the 
commercial banks. 
6 Nowhere in the Asian region has the impact of the crisis been more severe than in Indonesia. In order to 
protect the financial system, the central bank (Bank Indonesia) declared a guarantee on bank deposists and 
pumped liquidity into the banking system in January 1998. But neither the guarantee nor the liquidity 
support were extended to the BPRs, which now face liquidity constraints. Because the BRI village units are 
not engaged in foreign exchange, they are partly protected from the crisis, and the volume of savings 
increased in the village unit network. The value of loans outstanding by BRI village units and the BPR has 
fallen 25 to 50 percent in constant prices since the beginning of the crisis. Most if not all microfinance 




complementarity, competition and technical and financial links between the institutions 
can strengthen the whole financial system. 
 
THE ALTERNATIVE MODEL 
In some developing countries, market and state failures to reach the poor and rural 
areas are manifold, and microfinance institutions developed as an alternative to the 
deficient role of the state and the market. 
In Madagascar, the agricultural public bank BTM has never really managed to 
reach rural households and to offer microfinance services. In view of these deficiencies, 
five main networks largely based on mutualist principles have been developed with the 
support of foreign associations and international donors. However, their outreach is still 
quite low, reaching only about 25,000 households. At the national level, the structure of 
the rural financial system remains segmented. In some regions, virtually no formal 
financial services are accessible to the rural households. If the BTM is privatized, a large 
part of the 73 rural branches could be closed, which would further weaken the rural 
financial system. 
In West Africa, the failure of most of the agricultural development banks led 
either to the dismantling of the public-sector institutions (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, 
and Togo) or a fallback toward specialized lending for cash crops, as can be seen with 
cotton (Burkina Faso and Mali). Due to the success stories of microfinance, particularly 
in Asia, donors and the state have hoped that NGOs would be able to fill the gaps and 




that collect savings led the Central Bank of West African States to define a regulatory 
framework (called PARMEC law
7). While the Parmec law has made important headway 
toward regulating informal finance, it still raises some issues regarding the treatment of 
nonmutualist institutions, the capacity of authorities to implement the law, as well as 
some regulatory aspects (such as the ceilings on interest rates), which may affect the 
performance of credit unions (Berenbach and Churchill 1998; Lelart 1996). 
These divergent roles of the state are essentially the result of different financial 
capacities and political will dedicated to the development of the financial system. 
Nevertheless, it remains important to analyze when the state can promote, develop 
directly, or impede microfinance innovations in order to understand how these 
innovations may be broadly implemented. 
 
6. PLACE OF INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS FOR THE DIFFERENT 
MODELS 
The three models presented above differ on the respective role of the state, NGOs, 
and private commercial banks. The impact of the inner circle of institutional innovation, 
mainly analyzed here in terms of outreach, depend in part on the model. The analysis of 
the different country case studies draws some insights on the conditions that can enhance 
the impact of institutional innovations. 
 
                                                 
7 PARMEC stands for Projet d’Appui à la Réglementation des Mutuelles d’ Epargne et de Crédit (Project 




ADOPTION OF THE INNOVATIONS 
The models have different contribution in adoption of innovation. The example of 
the BRI village units shows that this public institution adopted a large range of 
innovations in order to cope with market failures (information system through local 
supervision and responsibilities; incentives for employees, borrowers, and savers; market 
rules; cost management). These innovations to credit and saving services have been 
implemented successfully and then disseminated in Indonesia: they include microfinance 
programs (PHBK, P4K), the regional state-owned banks (KURK, BKK), and the rural 
private banks (BPR). Indonesian innovations can also be replicated abroad, and BRI 
serves as an example of best practices. In this case, the Indonesian state has supported 
innovation then provided as a public good for the rest of the financial system (Yaron 
1992). 
Because NGOs receive some grants from donors, and because they have a deep 
knowledge of the local characteristics and constraints, they may also be the ones to test 
new niches such as poorer strata of the population or poorer areas or to test new 
methodologies (Gulli 1998). 
The model of integration that includes microfinance within the public sector may 
help support innovations due to their characteristic of public good. Nowadays, the state 
may still have to invest in the implementation of innovations such as microfinance 
services to agriculture or insurance services. Many studies underscore the urgent need for 
rural household insurance to cope with individual and covariant risks (Nguyen 1998; 




repayment. Because state-owned institutions have large networks, they can fulfill the 
conditions required for insurance systems, that is, large and diversified participation that 
allows risk pooling. Some NGOs and local organizations, aware of the needs, have 
already attempted to find some type of insurance scheme, but they are often limited by 
the narrow range of their client portfolio.  
On the other hand, the model of integration may slow down innovation. In India, 
the slow pace of transformation of the Regional Rural Banks (Mahajan and Ramola 
1996) brings out constraints to change that can also exist within public financial 
institutions. As expressed by North (in Harriss, Hunter, and Lewis 1995), "the individuals 
and organizations with bargaining power as a result of the institutional framework have a 
crucial stake in perpetuating the system." A balance of power must be created between 
the state, the local politicians (modern and traditional authorities), and the financial 
institutions through external control to avoid political intrusion, while ensuring a dynamic 
adoption of innovation and sound financial practices. The model of integration may lack 
this balance of power and external control as seen in the Indian case. 
 
BREADTH OF OUTREACH 
Existence of a Banking Structure in the Rural Areas 
The presence of a banking structure that may be publicly-owned, can enhance the 
breadth of outreach for microfinance. The model of integration or complementarity of 
microfinance within the public sector allows high coverage of the rural population. The 




which reaches 80 percent of the 5.6 million families, is impressive and unprecedented in 
developing countries (Yaron, Benjamin, and Piprek 1997). The success of the BRI village 
unit network in Indonesia underscores the role of a large initial financial investment from 
the state. In 1996, 95 percent of the units were profitable; they reached 16 million savers 
and 2.5 million borrowers. However, it should be noted that the BRI borrowers are not 
the poorest of the rural population in Indonesia. Nevertheless, thanks to its large and 
powerful network, BRI can support microfinance programs that reach around 200,000 
poor families
8. In countries such as India where 15,000-20,000 NGOs operate (Robinson 
cited in Kabeer and Murthy 1996), most NGOs work with hundreds, occasionally 
thousands, of members. These numbers represent minuscule coverage in light of the 
extent of poverty in the country and actual government coverage.  
The microfinance institutions, in a model of complementarity, use the banking 
structure to secure their activities and lower their transaction costs. Yet, to deal with the 
difficulties characterizing the public banking system (low efficiency and bad repayment 
rates), policymakers (government or donor) have three options to consider: liquidation, 
privatization, or restructuring. The first two options often weaken the structure of the 
rural banking system and may endanger further development of microfinance institutions 
that use the banking structure to back-up their activities. The successful transformation of 
the village unit of the BRI should be more widely disseminated. Moreover, how a state-
owned bank was successfully transformed and how this process could be replicated in 
other contexts to maintain a banking structure in rural areas should be carefully analyzed. 
                                                 
8 BRI supports the network of village units and a program of solidarity groups by supplying technical 




According to Hulme and Mosley (1996), "while prescribing the closure of nonprofitable 
institutions is relatively easy and facilitates the achievement of short-term public 
expenditure targets, the opportunity costs of not pursuing the “restructure” option may be 
very high." 
 
Absence of a Banking Structure in the Rural Areas 
The model of alternative makes the development of microfinance institutions 
more difficult. The example of Madagascar, where microfinance institutions try to fill the 
gap of the deficient banking structure, shows that in spite of the interesting and 
innovative experiences of the microfinance network, the total number of members 
reached is around 25,000. After 5 to 10 years of operation, this corresponds to a national 
rural outreach of less than 2 percent of rural households.
9 
The development of microfinance institutions as an alternative to the deficiencies 
of the state and the market comprises constraints that may limit their outreach. In spite of 
their growing importance in the field of microfinance, NGOs cannot be the only vehicle 
for microfinance services. Not all of the NGOs that have been or will be involved in 
microfinance projects will be efficiently and sustainably transformed into regulated 
formal institutions, following the example of Bancosol and FIE in Bolivia or K-Rep in 
Kenya. This is not the objective for most of them, and they cannot have enough capacity 
in terms of banking skills, security, or human resources.  
                                                 




In the long term, commercial banks should be more involved. They can offer 
physical infrastructure, well-established information systems, sound governance, 
important resources for funds and strong ability to offer financial services, but their role 
and capacities for microfinance should be strengthened in terms of organizational 
structure, financial methodology, human resources, and cost effectiveness (Baydas, 
Graham, and Valenzuela 1997). The state and the donors could play a role in capacity 
building for the commercial banks in order to reinforce the complementarity models. 
The role of the state could be to invest in network building and compensating for 
a missing financial market: a minimum banking structure could facilitate the 
development of a rural financial system where complementarity between the institutions 
increases the outreach and sustainability of microfinance.  
 
DEPTH OF OUTREACH 
Nowadays, the three models still face a trade-off between reaching the poorest 
and becoming financially sustainable. In spite of the general objective of microfinance 
institutions to alleviate poverty, and even if some NGOs clearly adopt the philosophy to 
fill the gap in the formal banking system, microfinance institutions are mostly located in 
wealthier areas. In India, Gupta (cited in Kabeer and Murthy 1996) argues that NGOs 
tend to follow the logic of the market and are concentrated in areas where the market is 
well-developed and people have started to articulate their needs as effective demand. The 
same observations have been made in Madagascar and Bangladesh (Zeller 1993; Zeller 




geographical areas; there are strong incentives for the networks to be located in the 
wealthier areas to obtain better performances. The BRI village units are more 
concentrated in Java and Bali (60 percent). But this corresponds to 60 percent of the 
population, and the BRI units are also present in the other islands. For the whole rural 
financial system, there is a strong orientation to the central bank, which provides 
incentive to develop institutions in the other islands by giving easier access to the licenses 
of operation for the rural banks (BPR). 
Most of the impact analysis (for example, Hulme and Mosley 1996; Wampfler, 
Prifti, and Brajha 1996; Sharma and Schrieder 1998) shows that neither NGOs, private 
commercial banks, nor state institutions seem to reach the poorest of the poor. Poverty is 
not only a problem of access to financial services but also a problem of access to other 
markets and services (such as labor, health, and education). Moreover, the very principles 
of some of the institutions are based on a sharing of the financial burden and the risks 
between members, leading most of the time to an exclusion of the poorest of the poor. 
In order to improve equity, reaching poor households through financial services is 
likely to require start-up subsidization depending on the expected social benefits 
compared to the costs (Zeller et al. 1997). It is widely recognized that achieving financial 
sustainability requires that the subsidies should not be provided directly to interest rates, 
but should support institutional building and training. Moreover, the incentive structure 
that can lead to an efficient use of subsidies must be elaborated through contracts 
between donors or state and the MFI that set-up the objectives and the use of subsidies. 




subject to rent-seeking pressure, and they are reluctant to enforce repayment as they can 
use it to strengthen some politically influential borrowers. The costs of mistakes made by 
one administration may be borne by later administrations. However, Stiglitz and Uy 
(1996) have underscored the use by the public development banks in East Asia of 
commercial- and performance-based criteria for allocating credit. These are replicable 
practices that enhance the likelihood that funds will be allocated to good ventures and 
reduce the likelihood of political abuse. 
This type of support can help microfinance reach poorer clients and serve more 
remote areas. But neither the integrated, complementary, or alternative models of 
microfinance vis-à-vis the public sector adequately reach the poorest of the poor. This 
may arise from inherent limitations of microfinance as a tool to alleviate extreme poverty, 
in which case, financial interventions are just part of a range of choices for development 
assistance programs seeking to reduce poverty (Gulli 1998). 
In fact, the analysis of the failures and success stories of public and private 
institutions underscore the importance of the governance structure of the institutions, 
which is beyond the distinction between private and public sectors. The relative success 
of development banks and directed credit in East Asia has been analyzed by Stiglitz and 
Uy (1996) as a result of different factors such as the ability to change credit policies 
rapidly when they were not functioning, the targeting of credit mainly to private 
enterprises, and based on performance measures, the limitation of subsidies and directed 




Having clear rules in terms of responsibilities, power, control, and protection from 
political interference allows smooth functioning of the institutions, trust, rapid resolution 
of conflicts, and better enforcement of the rules (Clarkson and Deck 1997). The right to 
manage can vary within the public sector, even if ownership remains public. The 
evolution of this right can lead to large differences in performances. The socioeconomic 
environment seems also to be more important than whether the MFI is publicly or 
privately owned, and fair competition in particular can play a stimulating role (Sen, Stern, 
and Stiglitz 1990; Lapenu 1998) 
 
7. THE STATE AND THE POLICY FRAMEWORK 
The three models defining the place of microfinance in the financial system cover 
a diverse and multifaceted development of rural financial services in the developing 
countries. As microfinance institutions grow, the question of their regulation has become 
an increasingly important issue. The state has in theory a major role to play in providing 
and instilling confidence in a regulatory framework, but governments have to know 
whether microfinance threaten macroeconomic stability and whether regulators can have 
the capacities to regulate all these new mushrooming institutions. 
 
DIFFERENT MODES OF REGULATION  
The necessity for regulation of microfinance is based on different arguments. The 




the Albanian "pyramids" in 1996 have underscored the risks of unregulated mobilization 
of savings. In order to implement efficient intermediation, microfinance institutions will 
have to leverage capital and mobilize external resources. This also requires to formalize 
the activities and to follow the financial rules to gain the confidence of other financial 
institutions. Finally, microfinance institutions may find that their official recognition 
gives them a competitive edge over informal competitors (confidence from the clients 
and barriers to entry against informal institutions that cannot meet the regulatory 
requirements). However, in most of the cases, because of the limited volume of 
transactions of microfinance, the threat for macro-economic stability is limited. 
The regulation of microfinance institutions by external bodies requires specific 
skills and increased means to enforce the rules. Often, the traditional supervisory 
agencies in developing countries already face difficulties in regulating a small number of 
big banks. Moreover, they are unfamiliar with concepts and technologies related to 
microfinance and may also lack the training necessary to effectively supervise these new 
types of institutions that come in large number, dealing with unconventional guarantees 
and decentralized operations (Jansson and Wenner 1997, Berenbach and Churchill 1998). 
On the other hand, NGOs want to acquire the authority and license to collect deposits, but 
they may not want to put up with the costs and restrictions imposed by the regulation. 
Effective regulations are useless unless the superintendencies have the authority and 
capacity to supervise and enforce, which represents a major challenge. 
The apex institutions have been usually justified as a substitute mechanism in the 




and Gonzalez-Vega (1994), even if apex institutions may perform important monitoring 
functions, they are not ideal frameworks for prudential regulation. In particular, the 
expertise of apex institution may remain limited, supervision must remain neutral, and 
supervisory activities and management tasks should be kept separate in order for 
supervision to deal only with a small number of clear rules. 
Supervision may be contracted-out to a third party. In Indonesia, because of the 
volume of institutions to supervise, the central bank relies on the BRI and on the 
provincial development banks (BPD
10) to supervise respectively more than 5,000 village 
banks (BKD
11) and around 6,000 provincial village banking networks (LDKP
12). The 
central bank in this case is fortunate to have appropriately qualified institutions to 
perform these functions (Berenbach and Churchill 1998). 
Each institution involved in microfinance should define from its inception a 
proper governance and supervision system based on clear rules and sharing of 
responsibilities. Donors, governments, and operators should follow a professional code of 
ethics. For example, a clear distinction appears to be necessary between (1) microfinance 
activities that involve strict enforcement of the contract loans with payment of 
commercial interest and reimbursement of capital and (2) subsidies to the rural areas that 
can be given through health services, food supply, education, and technical support for 
microenterprises. 
                                                 
10 BPD: Bank Penbangunan Daerah, provincial development bank owned by the provincial government. 
11 BKD: Badan Kredit Desa, village credit institution, owned by the village. 
12 LDKP:  Lembaga Dana dan Kredit Pedesaan, rural fund and credit institution, sponsored by provincial 




When regulation is enforced, it must strengthen the microfinance movement and 
should not impede its development with rigid rules or with narrow definitions of 
microfinance institutions that can block innovation. In the models of integration such as 
in China, India, Viet Nam and West Africa
13 where the state wants to control 
microfinance development, usury ceilings on interest rates for example can impede the 
financial viability of the institutions and the future access to financial services by the 
rural poor. In Madagascar, Viet Nam, or West Africa, clear orientation toward mutualist 
principles has been chosen. Even if these principles conform to the socioeconomic 
conditions in the rural areas, they can fix barriers to entry for innovative new comers. 
They can also restrain the capacities of development of the existing networks that do not 
fulfill all the mutualist requirements (for example, local saving mobilization, ownership 
of the structure by the members). A system of regulation should be developed with the 
strong involvement of the microfinance institutions in order to fit their needs, but it 
should not be applicable to them alone. 
 
THE SPECIFICITY OF MICROFINANCE 
Beyond the necessary internal control, external regulation must be defined, taking 
into account the risks and constraints in microfinance that differ from those of the 
commercial banks. Specific characteristics of microfinance institutions are presented in 
Table 2.  
 
                                                 
13 In India, until recently, the interest rates have been kept low and even now are capped for loans up to 




Table 2—Required regulations for microfinance institutions compared to 
commercial banks 
Compared to commercial banks, regulation for MFI should be…   
More flexible  More strict  The same 
Institutional 
form 
History of microfinance is 
rather new, regulation should 
encourage innovation 
a 
   
Ownership  Regulation should encourage 
investor motivated by social 
objectives, from diverse 
background and perspectives, 
or local private investors (local 
governance) 
Because investor may have limited 
capacities to provide capital, stricter 








Due to illiterate clients and to 
lower transaction costs, 
regulation should limit 
procedures for clients 
   
Financial 
services 
Regulation should encourage 
cost-saving services (e.g. 
mobile banking) 
MFI provide new services on the 
market,  require more testing & 
prudent introduction In general, no 





    Transparency necessary 
Limits on 
interest rates 
Higher transaction costs for 
MFI: reg. should allow interest 
rate that tend to cover the costs 




Dues to social importance of 
encouraging MFI, regulation 
should limit the impact of this 
rationing device 
   
Capital 
adequacy 
  Dues to less diversified portfolio 
and risks of capital shortage in case 
of emergency, need for stricter ratio 
 
Provisioning  Most of the loans 
uncollateralized, repayment 
incentives & non traditional 
collateral (e.g. solidarity group) 
should be recognized; no need 
for specific provisions 
Delinquency often more volatile, 
MFI more subject to covariant risks, 





Small size of transaction, less 
concentration of risks on a 
small number of big borrowers 
High level of risks: seasonality of 
demand, dependency on donors 




Subsidies could be justified for 
(1)initial stage of formation of 
the institutions, (2) innovation 
to reach the poorest people or 
remote areas 
  In general, necessity to 
reach financial 
sustainability 
Source: Lapenu 1996; Jansson and Wenner 1997; Rock and Otero 1997; Berenbach and Churchill, 1998. 
a In Latin America, new types of financial institutions have been created by law to facilitate the 
development of microfinance such as the Bolivian Private Financial Funds  (FFP) and the Peruvian Entities 





Even if some general prudential rules remain the same for commercial banks and 
MFIs, such as the transparency in ownership and financial accounting and the necessity 
to tend towards financial sustainability, some rules must be softened and other must be 
stricter for MFI compared to commercial banks. 
Because the history of microfinance is rather new, this imposes more flexibility to 
encourage innovation in institutional form, to motivate investors with diverse background 
and perspectives, to allow new types of collateral that do not require specific 
provisioning, or to accept some forms of subsidization for start-up capital or innovations. 
On the other hand, due to this young history, the sources of capital are less secured, and 
this requires stricter rules in terms of ownership, provisioning and capital adequacy. 
Moreover, MFIs provide new services on the market that require more testing and 
prudent introduction. 
In addition to the novelty of MFIs, their differences with commercial banks come 
from the specificity of the services they provide. Dealing with poor or illiterate clients, 
they should have more flexibility in terms of documents required from the clients, cost-
saving services offered, type of collateral accepted. On the other hand, they may have a 
less diversified portfolio and they can be subject to more volatile delinquency that may 
require stricter rules for capital adequacy, provisioning, and liquidity requirement. 
From Table 2, it follows that microfinance institutions need to be governed under 
specific regulations and not directly by the classical banking laws. The case of the 
Indonesian banking law (McLeod 1992; Lapenu 1996) could be underscored in this 




BPR ("people credit banks" or rural banks). The BPR are much smaller than the 
commercial banks, and they have to follow specific prudential rules that offer a flexible 
frame for rural banking. This frame has been implemented step by step, through different 
decrees. The 1992 banking law was set nearly 10 years after the first decree initializing 
financial liberalization in 1983. In 1998, new decrees were adopted to face the financial 
crisis that struck Indonesia, endangering its rural system. 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In spite of, and because of the enthusiasm for microfinance, urgent questions need 
to be addressed. The comparative analysis of microfinance institutions in different 
developing countries brings out the following points concerning an active role of the 
state. 
As pointed out by Stiglitz (1998), lending should clearly be primarily the 
responsibility of the private sector. However, the countries examined in this paper have 
also shown that in the rural financial system, state-owned institutions may achieve 
considerable outreach, compared with most NGOs and with the private commercial 
banks, which are not really involved in microfinance at this time. The existence of a 
banking sector in the rural areas can help microfinance institutions develop by reducing 
their transaction costs as a result of the financial and technical links they can establish 
with the banking system.  
Where an extensive network of financial institutions already exists, the 




strengthen the structure of the financial system, as has been the case with BRI in 1983–
86. The state must also offer a conducive regulatory and economic framework to allow 
private institutions, particularly microfinance institutions, to develop without constraint. 
"Partnership" should be established between the public and the private sector (Stiglitz 
1998). The government can change the "game" that the private participants are playing in 
ways that are welfare enhancing.  
Where no rural banking network exists, there is a large public role in creating a 
minimum banking structure where the private sector fails to adequately address the 
demands of specific poorer segments of the population. The state can develop public 
branches or provide incentive for commercial banks, through performance-based 
subsidies, or through investment in innovations. This minimum banking structure may be 
a precondition for microfinance institutions to move in.  
Few microfinance institutions are currently sustainable, and they continue to rely 
on subsidies. MFIs that are now sustainable have previously benefited from large 
amounts of subsidies. The success stories in microfinance show that subsidies are 
necessary for (1) start-up investment and network building and (2) development of 
innovations as a public good, in particular to define insurance schemes or to fill the gap 
of missing financial markets.  
Most of the impact analysis has shown that microfinance services do not reach or 
do not have a clear impact on the poorest of the poor: it is certainly an illusion to think 
that microfinance alone will draw this part of the population out of poverty. Extreme 




that can be offered, for example, through NGOs or state services, but independently from 
the financial services. If a clear orientation is taken toward alleviation of poverty for the 
poorest households and remote areas, the public sector must invest in these operations, 
since sustainable microfinance institutions will not be able to fulfill this role. Where no 
banking structure exists, this may also mean that the necessary conditions for the 
development of the rural financial system are not yet fulfilled, and in this case, the state 
must primarily invest in roads and market infrastructures, for example. 
To protect the clients and to strengthen the institutions, microfinance must have a 
clear juridical and regulatory framework. Microfinance institutions are rather new, but 
they are rapidly increasing. Monitoring them represents a huge challenge. The framework 
should be defined decree by decree in order to remain flexible and adaptable to changes 
and failures. Incentive structures should be established so that all the actors have a stake 
in the well functioning of the microfinance system. The superintendencies  need 
increasing human and financial resources that could be provided with the support of the 
donors and the state.  
Because of the complexity of regulating microfinance institutions, some "rules of 
the game" should be disseminated and implemented beyond the strict enforcement of the 
regulatory frame. At the level of the financial institutions, efficiency in outreach and 
sustainability depends, above all, on a practical and professional governance with clear 
definition of the responsibilities, strict enforcement of the rules, and circulation of the 
information. Efficient governance is the best determinant of the performance of the 




At the level of the financial market, a clear sharing of responsibilities among the 
state and the profit and not-for-profit private sectors could certainly enhance the 
efficiency of the system. The state must foster a conducive environment. External 
controls should be enforced to avoid political intrusion, which continues to endanger 
some microfinance institutions. Thanks to the public support to innovation, and to 
incentive structures implemented by the state or the donors, the public and private 
commercial banks should develop microfinance programs and linkages to strengthen 
local organizations. The NGOs should either respect the financial rules (such as non 
subsidized interest rates, strict enforcement of repayment) or choose to focus more on 
complementary services (training, group formation, screening, local supervision, and 
supply of health or education services) necessary to enhance the impact of microfinance 
for the poorest.   
Microfinance can be a powerful tool for economic development of rural areas in 
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